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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANET R. COX, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 92-0818 
K. NORMAN COX, Trial Court No. 904402060 
Defendant/Appellee. Priority Classification 15 
BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "plaintiff" or 
"wife") and submits the following as her Brief of Appellant in the 
above-captioned case: 
JURXSPTCTIQNAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final order and judgment herein, 
which is a Decree of Divorce, is vested in the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rules 
3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(i). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The matter below is a divorce proceeding, and the order 
appealed from is a Decree of Divorce. 
STATEMENT Of THE ISSffBS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1* Did the trial court err in making its property 
distribution in this case? Specifically: 
a. Did the trial court err in awarding the 
defendant/husband all his premarital assets, together with 
the vast majority of the marital assets of the parties? 
b. Did the trial court err in refusing to compensate 
the plaintiff for the fact that she had co-mingled and 
expended her premarital assets during the parties' marriage? 
c. Did the trial court err in failing to compensate 
plaintiff for an interest in the real property? 
d. Did the trial court err in ordering plaintiff to 
pay defendant's attorney's fees? 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to award either 
rehabilitative or permanent alimony to the plaintiff? 
3, Did the trial court err in the manner in which it 
interpreted the prenuptial contract entered between the parties? 
PETERHIHATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AWP RULES 
There is no case law authority nor statutory authority 
believed by the defendant to be wholly dispositive of the issues 
raised on appeal. 
2 
STANPARP QP mVlW 
The standard of review on appeal is an abuse of discretion 
standard as to all issues. The trial court should have broad 
discretion in domestic relations matters, and so long as that 
discretion is exercised within the confines of the proper legal 
standards set by the appellate courts of this state, and so long as 
the facts and reasons for the decision are set forth fully in 
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, this court 
should not disturb the resulting order* 
This court should review the factual findings of the trial 
judge under the "clearly erroneous11 standard. A finding is 
"clearly erroneous" when "although there is evidence to support it, 
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Ut. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the final judgment and decree of divorce 
entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, District Court 
Judge presiding, which, among other things, entered an order 
regarding property distribution, alimony, attorney's fees, and 
interpreting a prenuptial contract of the parties. 
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Wife filed for divorce in the trial court. Responsive 
pleadings were filed by defendant/appellee (also hereinafter 
"husband") and the matter came on before the lower court, sitting 
without a jury, for trial, on August 31, 1992. The trial court 
took the matter under advisement, and issued a memorandum decision, 
which was entered September 28, 1992* The memorandum decision is 
attached hereto as appendix lfC.ft 
Findings of fact, conclusions of law and The decree of divorce 
from which the plaintiff/appellant pursued this appeal were entered 
on October 28, 1992. A true and correct copy of the findings is 
attached as appendix "A." The decree is attached as appendix ,fB.,f 
A notice of appeal was filed on behalf of the defendant on November 
27, 1992. 
A copy is attached as appendix ,fD.M There have been no 
motions filed pursuant to Rule 50(a) or 50(b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59, 
of the Ut?ih Rtqeg Qf Civil PrpgQflmre, 
STATEHMT OF THE FACTS 
The parties to the above-captioned matter were previously 
husband and wife. They were married on July 1, 1988. They were 
divorced by a decree of divorce entered on October 28, 1992. The 
trial as to all issues was held on August 31, 1992. 
The parties do not have any children born as issue of their 
marriage. This marriage was the plaintiff's third marriage and the 
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defendant's second. At the time of their marriage, plaintiff was 
forty-seven years old and the defendant was fifty-six years old* 
(Findings of Fact 4, R.O.A. 214). Prior to the date of marriage, 
the parties executed a prenuptial contract. That prenuptial 
contract was admitted as exhibit 3 at the time of trial. A true 
and correct copy of this exhibit is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein as appendix "E." Page 4 of exhibit 3 recites 
that the value of the husband's estate, as of June 28, 1988, was 
approximately $380,000.00. The contract also recites that the 
wife's estate, as of June 28, 19a8, was valued at $70,000.00. 
There is no itemization of the parties' assets in exhibit 3. 
In 1966, husband built a house at 773 South 400 East in Orem, 
Utah. He paid a mortgage on the property in full. At the time of 
the parties' marriage in 1988, the property was unencumbered. 
(Findings of Fact 5, R.O.A. 214). 
Prior to the parties' marriage, the wife also owned a 
residence. She sold her separate residence prior to the parties' 
marriage, and received $21,000.00 as proceeds from that sale. From 
that $21,000.00, the wife repaid her parents $18,000.00 she had 
borrowed from them to purchase her residence in the first place. 
(Findings of Fact 6, R.O.A. 213). 
Contemporaneous with the execution of the parties' antenuptial 
agreement, the husband executed a warranty deed granting the wife 
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a joint interest in his premarital home. (Findings of Fact 9, 
R.O.A. 211# 212). A true and correct copy of the warranty deed in 
issue was admitted at trial as exhibit 4. A copy is attached 
hereto as appendix "P." This warranty deed was dated June 29, 
1988/ one day before the husband executed the antenuptial agreement 
on June 30, 1988* 
The value of the husband's home prior to this marriage and 
prior to remodeling was $77,000.00. The wife expended $18,062.65 
for remodeling of the husband's premarital home. Of this sum, 
$9/005.55 was expended by plaintiff prior to the execution of the 
antenuptial agreement. The plaintiff received "reimbursement" from 
the defendant during the marriage of $5,500.00 for a part of this 
sum. Therefore, plaintiff expended a net sum of $12,562.65 for 
remodeling the husband's premarital home. The defendant spent 
$11,931.00 for remodeling the home. (Findings of Fact 12, R.O.A. 
210, 211). The trial court has failed to find whether the 
defendant expended his money on the remodeling of his premarital 
home before or after the execution of the premarital contract, 
and/or before or after the parties' marriage. The trial court also 
failed to make a finding about the source of finds for this 
expenditure. 
The court found that the fair market value of defendant's 
premarital home at the time of the parties' separation was 
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$105,000.00. (Findings of Fact 13, R.O.A. 212). The court did not 
value the home as of the date of divorce. 
The trial court found (and plaintiff disputes the finding) 
that defendant's premarital home did not increase in value as a 
result of plaintiff's remodeling expenditures* The lower court 
found that the value of defendant's premarital home in 1988, plus 
the amount of the money the parties had paid jointly toward the 
remodeling, totalled $106,993.65, exceeding the $105,000.00 fair 
market value by $1,993.65. (Findings of Fact 13, R.O.A. 211). 
The trial court found that both parties liquidated their 
separate assets and "invested them in the marriage." (Apparently 
this means that assets were expended during the marriage.) 
(Findings of Fact 14, R.O.A. 211). The trial court specifically 
found that plaintiff had expended $74,000.00 during the marriage, 
$30,000.00 of that sum to her children. The court found that the 
defendant had expended $109,114.45 during the marriage. In other 
words, plaintiff expended all of her premarital assets, and a few 
thousand dollars more, during the course of the parties' marriage. 
The defendant expended less than one-third of his premarital assets 
during the parties' marriage. 
The court found the plaintiff's gross monthly income to be 
$1,850.00, and her "net worth" to be $10,539.00. (Findings of Fact 
15 and 19, R.O.A. 209, 210). The court found the defendant's net 
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worth at the time of separation to be $232,249*00, and his gross 
monthly income to be $554*00 per month. (Findings of Fact 15 and 
19, R.O.A. 209, 210). 
The trial court awarded husband all right, title and interest 
in the home in Orem, Utah. (Decree of Divorce, paragraph 7, R.O.A. 
217). Plaintiff was awarded her pre-marriage and post-marriage 
remodeling expenditures, in the sura of $12,562.65. (Decree of 
Divorce, paragraph 5, R.O.A. 218). Plaintiff was not granted a 
lien interest in the residence, nor a judgment against the 
defendant for this sum. 
The wife was ordered to pay some of defendant's attorney's 
fees, totalling $4,649.00. (Decree of Divorce, paragraph 10, 
R.O.A. 217). 
The plaintiff was not awarded any alimony from the defendant. 
(Decree of Divorce, paragraph 9, R.O.A. 217). 
From this final judgment and order of the court, the plaintiff 
filed a timely appeal. (R.O.A. 231). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's finding that the husband's income was in the 
total sum of $554.00 per month was a clearly erroneous finding. 
The evidence at trial supports a conclusion that the defendant's 
income far exceeded this amount. 
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Based upon the incomes of the parties, the disparity in their 
assets, and the disparity in their circumstances the court erred in 
failing to award the plaintiff alimony. 
The trial court erred in failing to find that the plaintiff 
had an interest in the Orem residence, and in failing to award her 
one-half the total value of that residence. 
The trial court erred in awarding the defendant attorney's 
fees, based upon the disparity in the parties' assets, and the 
reasonableness of the plaintiff's claims made at trial* 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
AWARD PLAINTIFF ALIMONY. 
A. The parties' incomes and circumstances were not 
properly considered by the court. 
As noted above, this Court should review the factual findings 
of the trial judge under a "clearly erroneous" standard. This 
Court should find the trial court's factual determinations to be 
"clearly erroneous" where, although there is some evidence to 
support the trial court's conclusions, the reviewing court "on the 
entire evidence is left the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed." State v. Walkerf supra. 
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Plaintiff is mindful of her obligation to this court to 
martial the evidence regarding the parties' respective 
circumstances, and to demonstrate, once the evidence has been 
marshalled, that it fails to pass the "clearly erroneous" standard. 
All of the evidence presented at trial regarding the parties' 
respective incomes came from the parties themselves. The wife 
testified that she was employed during the marriage as a secretary 
in the management-communication department at Brigham Young 
University. (Tr. p.30, 11.3-7). Her income at the time of the 
marriage was $1,008.58, net per month. (Tr. p.30, 11.8-12). 
In addition, during the marriage, the plaintiff received 
social security for her son from a previous marriage. She received 
a total of $6,400.00 from this source during the marriage. Of 
this, approximately half was paid directly to her son, and half was 
spent on marital expenses for these parties. (Tr. p.31, 11.2-24). 
At the commencement of the marriage, the plaintiff had some 
investment income, but the investments were liquidated during the 
marriage. She also received a lump sum of approximately $32,000.00 
from the liquidation of a contract on Oregon real property, which 
was disbursed, with agreement from the defendant, partly to 
plaintiff's children, and partly for marital obligations of this 
marriage. (Tr. p.32, 1.223). As of the date of trial, the wife 
had only her monthly income. She had no other source of income, 
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either from investment or contract receivables, such as she had 
enjoyed at the date of marriage. (Tr. p.46, 11•2-11). 
As of the time of trial, the wife was earning inadequate 
income to meet her monthly living expenses* She was receiving 
monthly assistance from her church to pay the mortgage for her new 
residence, and was receiving food assistance from her church. (Tr. 
p.43, 1.13 through p.44, 1.5; p.46, 1.22 through p.47, 1.4). 
Plaintiff requested assistance from the defendant, in the form 
of alimony at the rate of $250.00 per month, for a period of three 
years, in order to pursue an education to improve her income. (Tr. 
p.55, 11.2-10). 
The defendant testified that his monthly earnings in 1990, 
were in the sum of $1,400.00 per month. (Tr. p. 159, 11.2-7) • 
Prior to and during the parties' marriage, defendant owned a 
business, Ward's Body Shop. (Tr. p.158, 11.21-24). 
As of trial, defendant received $558.00 per month in 
unemployment benefits. He testified he was seeking employment, but 
had not been "called" on any job applications. (Tr. p.159, 11.8-
21). 
Defendant testified that he has "bad knees," which prevented 
him from performing auto body work at Ward's Body Shop. (Tr. 
p.169, ll.15-p.170, 1.5). Other than this testimony, no other 
evidence was adduced regarding defendant's "disability." Defendant 
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produced no medical report, nor the testimony of any health care 
provider, regarding his ability to obtain employment. 
The law in the state of Utah requires that a person be 
actively seeking employment and able to accept employment, in order 
to receive unemployment compensation. It should be assumed by this 
Court that, if the defendant qualified to receive unemployment 
compensation, he was capable of employment. His historical income, 
by his own testimony, was $1,400.00 per month. (The defendant did 
not testify, and the court did not make a finding, whether this was 
net or gross income.) 
Based upon all of this evidence, and upon a lack of evidence 
as to the defendant's "medical disability," the lower court's 
finding that defendant's income was $558.00 per month, is clearly 
erroneous. 
B. The trial court should have assessed the defendant 
for alimony under the circumstances of this case. 
As noted in the previous point of argument, the trial court 
should have attributed income to the defendant in excess of the 
amount of his monthly unemployment compensation. The court should 
have found that the parties' incomes were approximately equal. 
Further, the court should have found that other circumstances of 
the parties, beyond a mere consideration of income, warranted an 
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order for alimony. 
The trial court, in making a determination regarding an award 
of alimony, must consider the potential obligor's ability to pay 
alimony, the potential obligee's ability to provide support for 
herself, and the needs of the potential obligee. Jones v. Jones. 
700 P.2d, 1072 (Ut. 1985). 
The trial court found the third prong of this test to be 
satisfied, in that the court found the defendant did not and could 
not earn adequate income to support herself. (See the memorandum 
decision, R.O.A. 202). 
The second prong of the Jones test is satisfied. Clearly, if 
the obligee had a need for alimony, and she was already employed 
full-time, then she did not have an ability to support herself. 
The only remaining factor for consideration is the ability of 
the obligor to provide support. In this case, the trial court 
limited its consideration as to this factor to the issue of 
defendant's current income, and defendant's unsubstantiated 
"disability." The court below fails to consider the other 
components making up the defendant's financial circumstances. In 
making its determination regarding alimony, the trial court fails 
to consider that the defendant had a home valued at $105,000.00, 
virtually free of encumbrance. On the other hand, the plaintiff 
would not have had a home but for her parents' willingness to buy 
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a home and permit her to occupy the home, and the willingness of 
her church to pay the mortgage on that residence. 
The trial court failed to consider that the defendant enjoyed 
a total net worth in excess of $230,000.00, while the plaintiff's 
net worth was slightly more than $10,000.00, and comprised entirely 
of a retirement plan which she could not access without substantial 
penalty. 
The defendant might argue that such an order of alimony would 
have the effect of requiring the defendant to pay alimony out of 
his premarital property. This would not be an appropriate 
consideration for this Court to make. This Court has previously 
held in Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d, 616 (Ut. App. 1988), that 
an award of alimony may be entered which necessitates that alimony 
be paid out of premarital property. In the Sampinos case, this 
Court of Appeals approved an alimony award which required that the 
alimony be paid out of coal contract proceeds which were determined 
to be the obligor's sole and separate property. 
Under all of the circumstances here, it was error for the 
trial court to fail to award alimony to the plaintiff. The matter 
should be remanded to the trial court for imposition of an award of 
alimony, and findings of fact as to the appropriateness of 
permanent versus rehabilitative alimony. 
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POINT II • THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF ONE-HALF 
THE OREM RESIDENCE. 
Plaintiff concedes that defendant owned the Orem residence in 
issue for a substantial period of time prior to the parties' 
marriage. Ordinarily, pursuant to the laws of the state of Utah, 
the defendant would be entitled to receive the home as his 
premarital property, free and clear of any interest of the 
plaintiff. 
However, in the instant case, the circumstances which occurred 
immediately before and during the marriage of the parties are such 
that the plaintiff acquired a legal interest in an equitable 
interest in the Orem residence. This property interest should have 
been divided equally between the parties, as of the date of the 
divorce. 
Approximately two days before the parties' marriage, and one 
day before he executed the antenuptial contract, the defendant 
conveyed the property in question to the parties, jointly, as joint 
tenants, by means of a warranty deed. Plaintiff expended over 
$9,000.00 in the remodeling of the home, in the months immediately 
prior to the marriage, and over $9,000,00 in remodeling the home 
after the marriage. It is irrelevant that the defendant 
"reimbursed* the plaintiff $5,500.00 during their marriage. A 
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financial conveyance of this sort between husband and wife during 
a marriage does not and should not alter the nature and extent of 
the marital estate* 
The defendant also contributed a substantial sum of money to 
the remodeling of the residence. The trial court found that he had 
paid $11,931.00 for the remodeling. It is a reasonable inference 
that he paid this sum out of income earned during the marriage, 
since defendant was employed during the marriage. The court makes 
no finding to the contrary. If defendant paid these funds out of 
earned income, then these funds arer also a marital asset. 
The parties lived together in the home as husband and wife. 
The home appreciated in value from its 1988 fair market value of 
$77,000.00 to its value of $105,000.00 on the date of separation. 
The trial court has made a finding that the increase in the 
value of the Orem residence was not a result of the plaintiff's 
remodeling expenditures. This finding is plain error. An 
application of simple arithmetic to the problem indicates that the 
1988, $77,000.00 value, added to the plaintiff's total remodeling 
expenditures of $18,062.65, and the defendant's total remodeling 
expenditures of $11,931.00, totals $106,993.65, or only about 
$2,000.00 more than the fair market value at the date of 
separation. There was no evidence from any real estate appraiser, 
or any other expert, to show any cause for increase in the value of 
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the home between 1988 and 1992, other than the remodeling paid for 
jointly by the parties. 
Under these circumstances, it was error for the trial court 
simply to reimburse plaintiff for her repair costs, without 
interest, and without even any security for these costs awarded, 
and to award the home to the defendant. The court's of this state 
have recognized that, though the general rule is that premarital 
property may be viewed as the separate property of a party, this is 
not binding in all circumstances. In Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d, 
1144 (Ut. App. 1988), the court found that "premarital property" 
may be subject to distribution in a divorce case. The Naranjo 
court stated: 
. . . A party may be awarded property 
which the other spouse brought into the 
marriage. In fashioning an equitable 
property division, trial courts must consider 
all of the pertinent circumstances, including 
the amount and kind of the property to be 
divided, the source of the property, the 
parties' health, the parties7 standard of 
living and respective financial conditions, 
their needs and earning capacities, the 
duration of the marriage, what the parties 
gave up by the marriage and the relationship 
the property division has with the amount of 
alimony awarded. 
In this case, the premarital property was commingled by virtue 
of the warranty deed. Moreover, the plaintiff made substantial 
contributions toward improving the value of the residence, both by 
paying for the expenses of remodeling, and by enduring the 
inconvenience of remodeling while it was in progress. Because of 
all these circumstances, she acquired a full title interest in the 
home, and should have received half the value thereof at trial. 
The defendant may argue that the antenuptial agreement of the 
parties mandated that the house be awarded to the defendant as his 
sole and separate property. This is not the case. To the extent 
that the trial court relied upon the antenuptial contract as the 
basis to award the home to the defendant, the trial court erred in 
interpreting the contract. 
The plaintiff concedes that antenuptial contracts are 
generally recognized and enforceable in the state of Utah. 
. . .In general, pre-nuptial agreements 
concerning the disposition of property owned 
by the parties at the time of their marriage 
are valid so long as their is no fraud, 
coercion, or material non-disclosure. Hack 
v. Hack. 734 P.2d, 417 (Ut. 1986). 
The problem for the defendant with the antenuptial contract 
in the case now before the court is the ambiguity contained in the 
contract with regard to the defendant's assets. The contract 
purports to provide full disclosure of each party's assets by 
listing a total net worth of each party. The contract fails to 
identify with particularity, however, exactly what assets go into 
making up that net worth. There is no specific list of assets 
included in or appended to the antenuptial contract. Therefore, it 
is impossible to determine whether the defendant disclosed the 
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value of his assets by including or excluding the value of the Orem 
home • 
The defendant, in apparent contradiction to the antenuptial 
contract, executed a warranty deed on the day before he executed 
the contract. The warranty deed vested the plaintiff with an 
undivided one-half interest in the Orem home, as a joint tenant 
with defendant* After granting the plaintiff this title interest 
in the property, the defendant then signed a contract disclosing 
his net worth, without specifying his assets, and agreeing with the 
plaintiff that his premarital assets would be awarded to him. 
It is clear from this conduct that the defendant intended to 
award the plaintiff a title interest in the Orem residence. He 
apparently intended to protect other premarital assets (including 
his interest in a cabin in the Ward's Body Shop business) from the 
plaintiff in the event of a divorce. He repented of his decision 
to give the plaintiff the Orem home only after it became apparent 
that the parties' marriage would not last. 
Under all of the circumstances, the court below erred in 
failing to award plaintiff her one-half interest in the home. 
Further, the home should have been valued as of the date of the 
decree, not as of the date of separation. Beraer v. Berger, 713 
P.2d, 695 (Ut. 1985). The matter should be remanded to enter 
judgment awarding plaintiff a one-half interest in the orem home as 
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of October 29, 1992. 
POINT III* THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
ORDERING THE PLAINTIFF TO PAY 
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The trial court ordered that the plaintiff would pay the 
defendant's attorney's fees in the sum of $4,649.00. It is clear 
from the record that the determination to award the defendant this 
sum in attorney's fees was based upon the plaintiff's failure to 
accept the defendant's offer of judgment. (The offer appears at 
R.O.A., 121). The trial court's determination was not more 
favorable to the plaintiff than the defendant's pretrial offer of 
judgment. (Findings of Fact 21, R.O.A., 209). There is no other 
basis for the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the 
defendant than the plaintiff's failure to accept the offer of 
judgment. 
The trial court's ruling misinterprets Rule 68 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 68(b) reads, in pertinent part as 
follows: 
. . . If the judgment finally obtained 
by the offeree is not more favorable than the 
offer, the offeree must pay the costs 
incurred after the making of the offer. . . . 
Rule 68 makes reference to "costs" and not to attorney's fees. 
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The costs provided for in this Rule are limited to taxable costs 
only, and do not include attorney's fees. Nelson v. Newman, 583 
P.2d, 601 (Ut. 1978). Therefore, the trial court committed error 
in assessing attorney's fees solely upon the basis of Rule 68. 
The trial court had wide latitude, pursuant to its equitable 
powers in this divorce proceeding, to award attorney's fees and to 
assess costs of trial, including costs which would otherwise be 
non-taxable costs. Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Ut. App. 1989). 
However, a trial court has an obligation to make adequate factual 
findings to support this conclusion. Failure to make adequate 
findings on all material issues is reversible error in and of 
itself. Jeffries v. Jeffries. 80 U.A.R., 18 (Ut. App. 1988). 
There is absolutely no factual finding of the trial court, 
other than the erroneous legal conclusion regarding the offer of 
judgment, to support the order that plaintiff pay attorney's fees 
to defendant. 
This matter should be remanded to the trial court for a 
factual determination regarding equitable issues surrounding the 
attorney's fees award. 
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CQECEUSTON 
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the trial court in 
this matter should be reversed and remanded for entry of an order 
awarding the plaintiff alimony, for entry of an order awarding the 
plaintiff one-half interest in the Orem residence, and for entry of 
specific findings regarding an appropriate attorney's fees award in 
this case. 
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees incurred in 
pursuing this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS day of June, 1993. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CONCISION 
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the trial court in 
this matter should be reversed and remanded for entry of an order 
awarding the plaintiff alimony, for entry of an order awarding the 
plaintiff one-half interest in the Orem residence, and for entry of 
specific findings regarding an appropriate attorney's fees award in 
this case. 
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees incurred in 
pursuing this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS / / day of June, 1993. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
• ^ — 
MARY/fT CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
& Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff/appellant herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing BRIEF, to be served upon defendant/appellee 
by hand-delivering two true and correct copies of the same in an 
envelope addressed to: 
BYRON FISHER 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Twelfth Floor 
215 State, P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
on the / V day of J-^ A n &
 ; t 1993. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
& Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff/appellant herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing BRIEF, to be served upon defendant/appellee 
by hand-delivering two true and correct copies of the same in an 
envelope addressed to: 
BYRON FISHER 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Twelfth Floor 
215 State, P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
on the day of , 1993. 
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MARILYN MOODY BROWN, ESQ. #4803 
ROBINSON, SEILER, GLAZIER & BROWN 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
RICHARD L. PEEL, ESQ. 
Nevada State Bar #4359 
228 S. Fourth Street 
Las Vegas, NV 89101 
Telephone: (702) 382-0711 
Attorneys for Defendant K. NORMAN COX 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET R. COX, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
K. NORMAN COX, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 904402060 
This matter came before the Court for trial on August 31, 
1992. Plaintiff appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H. 
Weight, Esq. Defendant appeared in person and by counsel, 
Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and Richard L. Peel, Esq. The parties 
presented a Stipulation to the Court. The Court proceeded to 
hear the matter on its merits and now enters the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that Plaintiff meets the residency 
requirements of the divorce statutes of the State of Utah. 
2. The Court finds that the parties have experienced 
irreconcilable differences, such that Plaintiff should be awarded 
a decree of divorce. 
3. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant were 
married for fewer than three years. From the day they were 
married, July 1, 1988, to the date of their final separation, 
December 1, 1990, the parties were only married for twenty-nine 
months. Of the twenty-nine month marriage, the parties 
experienced a brief trial separation of five months. 
4. The Court finds that at the time of their marriage, 
Plaintiff was 47 years old and Defendant was 5 6 years old. This 
was Plaintiff's third marriage and Defendant's second. No 
children were born into the marriage. 
5. The Court finds that in 1966, Defendant built a house 
at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah, 84058. Defendant raised nine 
children in this house and paid off a twenty year VA mortgage 
sometime in 1987. At the time of the parties' marriage, July 1, 
1988, the property was unencumbered by mortgage or lien. 
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6. The Court finds that prior to the parties' marriage, 
Plaintiff sold her separate residence against the advise of 
Defendant, and her brother-in-law, an accountant. From the 
$21,000 proceeds of the that sale, Plaintiff repaid her parents 
the $18,000 she had borrowed from them to purchase the home. 
7. The Court finds that prior to the marriage, Plaintiff 
had a net worth of $74,000. Plaintiff's $74,000 net worth 
included the $18,000 she repaid to her parents. The Court finds 
that Defendant had a net worth.of $3 68,000. 
8. The Court finds that prior to the marriage, the parties 
executed an Antenuptial Agreement. Plaintiff executed the 
Antenuptial Agreement on June 28, 1988 and Defendant executed the 
Antenuptial Agreement on June 30, 1988. Defendant intended for 
his premarital assets, including his personal home, to be 
protected under the provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement, and 
Plaintiff had knowledge of Defendant's intent to protect his 
personal home. Under the provisions of the Antenuptial 
Agreement, the parties contractually retained the right to 
dispose of their separate property by commingling such assets or 
otherwise. 
9. The Court finds that nearly contemporaneous with the 
parties' signing of the Antenuptial Agreement, Defendant executed 
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a Warranty Deed granting Plaintiff a joint interest in his 
premarital home. 
10. The Court finds that Plaintiff's attorney in 1988, Doug 
Nielsen, advised and counseled the parties regarding the 
execution of the Antenuptial Agreement and Warranty Deed. Mr. 
Nielsen drafted the Antenuptial Agreement and Warranty Deed. 
Defendant's attorney, Phil Ivie, was not present at any of the 
meetings held between the parties and Mr. Nielsen. Mr. Nielsen 
did not send the Warranty Deed^to Mr. Ivie, for his review, nor 
did Mr. Nielsen speak with Mr. Ivie at any time regarding the 
Warranty Deed. 
11. The Court finds that the provisions of the Warranty 
Deed are patently incompatible with the protection provision of 
the Antenuptial Agreement. The Antenuptial Agreement was clearly 
intended by the parties to protect their separate property. That 
is precisely why they sought the services of an attorney. 
Clearly, the Warranty Deed was an afterthought by the parties. 
12. The Court finds the value of Defendant's home prior to 
marriage and prior to the remodeling was $77,000.00. The Court 
finds that Plaintiff expended $18,062.65 for remodeling of 
Defendant's premarital home (of this amount $9,005.55 was spent 
by Plaintiff prior to the marriage and prior to the execution of 
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the Antenuptial Agreement). The Court finds that Plaintiff 
received $5,500 from Defendant as reimbursement of the amounts 
expended by her. The Court finds that Plaintiff expended 
$12,562.65 and that Defendant spent $11,931.00 on the remodeling. 
13. The Court finds that the fair market value of 
Defendant's premarital home at the time of the parties' 
separation was $105,000.00. Defendant's premarital home did not 
increase in value as a result of Plaintiff's remodeling 
expenditures. The value of Defendant's premarital home in 198 8 
plus the amount of monies the parties paid toward the remodeling 
or $106,993.65, exceeds the $105,000 fair market value of the 
home. 
14. The Court finds that both parties liquidated separate 
assets and invested them in the marriage. The Court finds 
Plaintiff expended $74,000.00 during marriage, of which Plaintiff 
paid in excess of $3 0,000 to her children. The Court finds 
Defendant expended $109,114.45 during the marriage. 
15. The Court finds that Plaintiff's net worth at the time 
of separation was $10,539.00 and Defendant's net worth at the 
time of separation was $232,249. Plaintiff's net decrease was 
$63,461 and Defendant's net decrease was $135,709. 
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16. The Court finds that the parties should be awarded the 
personal property as it has been divided between the parties. 
The Court finds that Defendant should pay the remaining debt owed 
to Zion/s First National Bank, which was incurred in February, 
1989; the proceeds of which were used for the acquisition of 
personal property. 
17. The Court finds that expenditures made by either party 
prior to the marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the remodeling 
costs), or after the separation date, December 1, 1990, are not 
claimed, at issue, or reimbursable. 
18. The Court finds that Defendant paid to Plaintiff 
$10,725.00 during the marital period. This amount includes the 
$5,500 amount Defendant paid to Plaintiff to reimburse her for 
her remodeling costs. 
19. The Court finds that Plaintiff's current gross monthly 
income is $1,850.00 and Defendant's current gross monthly income 
from unemployment compensation is $554.00 per month. Defendant's 
historical income is irrelevant because of his sale of his 
business and because his physical disability precludes him from 
seeking full-time employment in his area of training; autobody 
repair. 
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20. The Court finds that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant 
are able to meet their respective financial obligations. Both 
parties suffered significant financial reversals during the very 
short marriage and Defendant's ability to pay alimony is clearly 
lacking. 
21. The Court finds that Defendant proffered a $24,000 
Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff on or about August 12, 1992, which 
Plaintiff declined to accept. Subsequent to August 12, 1992, 
Defendant incurred $4,649 in attorneys fees and costs. 
22. The Court finds that Defendant should be awarded all 
right, title and interest in all real property he brought into 
the marriage, including his premarital home and other personal 
properties not otherwise awarded to Plaintiff. 
23. The Court finds that Plaintiff should be awarded all 
rights, title and interest she has in and to her retirement. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff should be awarded a decree of divorce from 
and against Defendant, the same to become final and absolute upon 
signing by the Court and entry by the Clerk in the Registry of 
Actions. 
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2. Plaintiff should be awarded the personal property she 
presently has in her possession. Defendant should be awarded the 
personal property he presently has in his possession. 
3. Defendant should be ordered to pay the debt owing to 
Zion's First National Bank, which was incurred in February of 
1989. Each party should be ordered to pay all debts he or she 
incurred prior to their marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the 
remodeling costs) or after the separation date of 12/1/90 (but 
for Defendant's attorneys fees. and costs incurred subsequent to 
8/12/92). 
4. Defendant should be ordered to reimburse Plaintiff for 
her pre-marriage and post marriage expenditures for remodeling 
Defendant's premarital home, located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, 
Utah, in the stipulated amount of $12,562.65. 
5. Defendant should be awarded legal title and possession 
of all real property he brought into the marriage, including his 
personal home located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah and all 
personal property not otherwise awarded to Plaintiff. 
6. Plaintiff should be ordered to immediately reconvey to 
Defendant by quit claim deed, title to Defendant's premarital 
home located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah. 
8 
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7. Plaintiff should be awarded all rights, title and 
interest she has in her retirement and savings, 
8. Plaintiff is not entitled to alimony. 
9. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant's 
attorneys fees and costs incurred subsequent to August 12, 1992 
in the amount of $4,649; $2,3 60 for the legal services of Richard 
L. Peel, Esq,, and $2,289 for legal services rendered by Marilyn 
Moody Brown, Esq. 
10. Plaintiff is entitled to restoration of her maiden 
name. 
Let a decree be entered accordingly. 
DATED this &Zc£? day of October, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
d i s t r i c t C o u r t Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
~£aJrep4Eii 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Gary 
Weight, Esq., attorney for Plaintiff, at Aldridge, Nelson, Weight 
& Esplin, Post Office Box L, Provo, Utah 84603 this day of 
October, 1992. 
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MARILYN MOODY BROWN, ESQ. #4803 
ROBINSON, SEILER, GLAZIER & BROWN 
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Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
RICHARD L. PEEL, ESQ. 
Nevada State Bar #4359 
228 S. Fourth Street 
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Telephone: (702) 382-0711 
Attorneys for Defendant K. NORMAN COX 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET R. COX, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
K. NORMAN COX, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil NO. 904402060 
This matter came before the Court for trial on August 31, 
1992. The Plaintiff appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H. 
Weight, Esq. The Defendant appeared in person and by counsel, 
Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and Richard L. Peel, Esq. The parties 
presented a Stipulation to the Court. The Court proceeded to 
hear the matter on its merits and having heretofore entered its 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters the 
following: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from and 
against the Defendant, the same to become final and absolute upon 
signing by the Court and entry of the Clerk in the Registry of 
Actions. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the personal property she 
presently has in her possession. 
3. Defendant is awarded the personal property he presently 
has in his possession. 
4. Defendant is ordered to pay the debt owing to Zion's 
First National Bank, which was incurred in February of 1989. 
Each party is ordered to pay his or her own debts incurred prior 
to the marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the remodeling costs), or 
after the separation date, December 1, 199 0. 
5. Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff within sixty (60) 
days from the date of this decree, Plaintiff's pre-marriage and 
post marriage remodeling expenditures, in the stipulated amount 
of $12,562.65. 
6. Defendant is awarded all real property which he brought 
into the marriage, including his personal home located at 773 
- 2 -
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South 400 East, Orem, Utah, and all personal property not 
otherwise awarded to Plaintiff herein. 
7. Plaintiff is ordered to immediately reconvey to 
Defendant by quit claim deed, title to Defendant's premarital 
home located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah. 
8. Plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest she 
has in her retirement and savings. 
9. Plaintiff's claim to alimony is denied. 
10. Plaintiff is ordered^to pay within sixty (60) days of 
the date of this Decree, Defendant's attorneys fees and costs 
incurred subsequent to August 12, 1992, in the amount of $2,360 
to Richard Peel, Esq., and $2,289 to Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. 
Defendant may at his option and by permission of his attorneys, 
deduct such attorneys fees and costs from the $12,562 he is 
ordered to pay Plaintiff. 
Let a decree be entered accordingly. 
DATED this £3 day of October, 1992. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET R. COX, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
K. NORMAN COX, 
Defendant. 
DECISION 
Case No. 904402060 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the court for trial on August 31, 1992. The plaintiff 
appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H. Weight, Esq. The defendant appeared in person 
and by counsel, Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq., and Richard Peel, Esq. The parties presented 
a stipulation and made opening arguments. At issue was (1) the award of alimony, (2) the 
fair and equitable division of assets and (3) the award of attorney's fees. Evidence was taken 
and the matter was taken under advisement. The court received a supplemental 
memorandum from defendant and both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. This court has fully considered the evidence, memoranda submitted by 
counsel and oral argument. 
The court, being fully advised in the premises, now enters its: 
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RULING 
I. ALIMONY 
Plaintiff seeks alimony in this case. The court will consider three factors in 
determining an award of alimony: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or 
herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Burt v. Burt. 799 
P.2d 1166 (Ut.App. 1990). 
A. Facts. 
In this case, the defendant sold his business after the separation of the parties. He 
had some employment with Utah Valley Community College but has not been able to renew 
his contract. He presently receives temporary unemployment compensation of $554.00 per 
month and is seeking gainful employment. Those unemployment benefits commenced the 
second week of July and will continue for twenty-six weeks. His historical earnings prove to 
be $1,457.00 per month and his earnings at UVCC were $17.65 per hour for approximately 
15 hours per week. In addition, he receives $500.00 per month from the sale of his 
business. He suffers from a physical disability, necessitating knee operations. He cannot 
afford the operation which, if performed, would lay him up for six months. He borrows 
between $500.00 to $600.00 per month from his children in order to meet his financial 
obligations. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, earns $1,850.00 gross income and receives $1,134.00 net 
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income after deductions for taxes and retirement and savings accounts. Even the plaintiff 
recognizes that the present circumstances of the parties do not seem to compel an award of 
alimony to the plaintiff. The defendant's ability to pay alimony is clearly lacking at the 
present time. His historical earnings are not relevant because of his sale of his business and 
because his physical disability now precludes him from seeking jobs in his area of training; 
autobody repair. 
It is important to note that plaintiff has enrolled in an Executive Masters Program in 
Public Administration through Brigham Young University. That executive program is 
conducted at night and will not interfere with her employment status. Brigham Young 
University will pay plaintiffs full tuition, but not associated costs. 
It is clear from the evidence that neither party now is able to meet respective financial 
obligations. The plaintiff, since separation, has purchased a condominium and encumbered 
herself with a mortgage. Defendant has sold off numerous personal items, a gun collection, 
snowmobiles, cars, etc in attempting to finance the marriage. He also assumed new loans 
during the marriage. Most marketable personal items have been sold. 
B. Decision 
Applying the factors in Burt v. Burt, it is clear that the financial conditions and needs 
of both parties are deplorable. The plaintiff has enrolled in a tuition-paid graduate program 
with the hopes of bettering her financial position. Defendant currently has no such 
opportunity. Defendant has no current employment and because of physical disabilities, no 
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reasonably foreseeable ability to obtain employment and to pay alimony. The marriage is of 
a very short duration and both parties suffered significant financial reversals during the 
marriage. Accordingly, no alimony award is merited. 
E. PROPERTY DIVISION 
A. Facts 
The parties married on July 1, 1988, in South Jordan, Utah. At marriage, plaintiff 
was 47 years old and defendant was 56 years old. Their marriage was the third for the 
plaintiff and second for the defendant. There were no children as issue of the marriage. 
The marriage is of short duration (29 montfis), including a 5 month trial separation. 
The financial declarations of both parties support the fact that this marriage was a financial 
disaster for both parties. 
The parties stipulated to various facts which affect property settlement matters and the 
court adopts the following: 
1. Remodeling costs. The amount spent on remodeling by plaintiff was a total of 
$18,062.65 (of this amount $9,005.55 was spent by plaintiff in remodeling prior to the 
marriage and prior to the execution of the antenuptial agreement). Plaintiff received $5,500 
from defendant as reimbursement of the amounts expended by her. Plaintiff spent 
$12,562,65 for remodeling. Defendant spent approximately $11,931 on remodeling. 
Remodeling was completed in order to accommodate the combination of the two families. 
2. Personal property. The personal property will be awarded to the parties as it 
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has been divided. Defendant will assume the debt to Zion's First National Bank which was 
incurred in February, 1989 by the parties and was used for the acquisition of the personal 
property. Each party will pay all other debts he or she incurred after the separation date of 
12/1/90. 
3. Expenditures prior to marriage and post separation. Expenditures made by 
either party prior to the marriage (but for the remodeling costs) or after the separation date 
(December 1, 1990), are not claimed, at issue, or reimbursable. 
4. Value of separate property. The parties stipulate that the actual amounts that 
should have been inserted in the antenuptial agreement for Norman Cox should have 
been$368,000 and the amount that should have been inserted in the antenuptial agreement for 
Janet Cox was $74,000. 
5. Net worth of parties at time of separation. (The court chooses to accept the 
appraisal of Timothy Campbell). Plaintiffs net worth at time of separation was $10,539. 
Defendant's net worth at time of separation was $232,249. The plaintiffs net decrease was 
$63,461. The defendant's net decrease is $135,709. 
6. Amount of cash given by defendant to plaintiff. The amount of cash paid to 
the plaintiff during the marital period by the defendant was $10,725 (inclusive of 
reimbursement of remodeling costs). 
7. Expenditures by the parties. Plaintiffs expenditures during the marriage was 
$74,000. Additionally, plaintiff gave to her children $24,000. The total amount that 
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plaintiff paid to her children by check (some of which is included above) is $31,284.15. 
Defendant's expenditures during the marriage were $109,114.45. 
8. Current income. Plaintiffs current gross income is $1,850.00 per month. 
Defendant's current unemployment compensation is $554.00 per month. The defendant's 
historical income is $1457.00 per month. 
9. Cabin and retirement benefits. The plaintiff waives her claim for an interest in 
defendant's cabin. The defendant waives his claim for an interest in plaintiffs retirement or 
any other property belonging to plaintiff. The plaintiff waives any interest in defendant's 
business or proceeds from the sale of business or any other property belonging to defendant. 
Prior to marriage, the parties executed an antenuptial agreement and the defendant 
intended for his premarital assets, including his personal home, to be protected under the 
provisions of the antenuptial agreement. The plaintiff had knowledge of defendant's intent to 
protect his personal home. The agreement was executed on June 30, 1988, two days prior to 
the marriage. Nearly contemporaneous with the signing of the prenuptial agreement, (June 
29, 1988), defendant executed a warranty deed granting plaintiff a joint interest in his 
premarital home. 
The protection provision of the antenuptial agreement is patently incompatible with 
the provisions of the deed. Plaintiffs attorney in 1988, Doug Nielsen, advised and 
counseled the parties regarding the execution of the antenuptial agreement and warranty 
deed. Mr. Nielsen drafted the antenuptial agreement and the warranty deed. Defendant's 
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attorney, Phil Ivie, was not present at any of the meetings held between the parties and Mr. 
Nielsen. Mr. Nielsen did not send the warranty deed to Mr. Ivie for his review, nor did Mr. 
Nielsen speak with Mr. Ivie at any time regarding the warranty deed. It is unclear from the 
disparate testimony of the witnesses whether defendant was confused, or whether he truly 
intended to grant a joint interest to the plaintiff, irrespective of the mutually acknowledged 
protection provision of the antenuptial agreement. 
The defendant built the subject house in 1966, raised nine children there, and paid off 
his twenty year VA mortgage sometime in 1987. At the time of the marriage of the parties 
in 1988, the property was unencumbered by mortgage or lien. 
The value of the residence at separation was disputed, and the court accepts the more 
professional appraisal of Mr. Timothy Campbell which established the value at $105,000.00. 
There is no dispute that the value of the subject premises at the time of the marriage was 
$77,000.00. 
Just prior to the marriage, plaintiff sold her separate residence. There is evidence 
that plaintiffs brother, an accountant, and the defendant both advised her to keep the home. 
From the proceeds of that sale, plaintiff paid her parents $18,000.00. They, evidently had 
loaned her money to purchase the premises. While it is true that plaintiff liquidated her 
home in anticipation of the marriage, it is also true that she had little equity in that home. 
At closing she received $21,000.00, $18,000.00 of which was immediately paid to her 
parents. It appears that plaintiffs net worth at the time she executed the prenuptial 
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agreement, $74,000, included the $18,000.00 which she repaid to her parents. Plaintiff 
expended approximately $74,000.00 during the marriage. She liquidated some assets and 
approximately $30,000.00 was given directly to her children during the marriage. In light of 
the above, plaintiffs argument of detrimental reliance appears to lack foundation. 
B. DISCUSSION 
The stipulation resolves all property disputes except for a consideration of the division 
of defendant's premarital home. The prenuptial agreement protects defendant's interest and 
the warranty deed purports to convey a one half interest to plaintiff. Article I of the 
antenuptial agreement provides that each party's separate property and the proceeds thereof 
would remain separate. 
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to a one half interest in the defendant's premarital 
home. Defendant argues that plaintiff is only entitled to reimbursement for her pre and post 
marriage remodeling cost, and any accrued valued. This court is more persuaded by 
defendant's argument. The court adopts the following reasoning of defendant. 
Utah court have held that disposition of property under an antenuptial agreement is 
valid as long as there is no fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure. D'Aston v. D'Aston. 
808 P.2d 111 (Ut.App. 1990); Berman v. Berman. 749 P.2d 1271 (Ut.App. 1988). The 
antenuptial agreement the plaintiff executed on June 28, 1988, was validly executed and was 
not subject to fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure. The parties entered into the 
agreement upon plaintiffs request, her attorney drafted the agreement, the parties were 
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competent, the agreement was duly signed and notarized, and as consideration therefore both 
parties, separate property was protected. Additionally, plaintiffs own attorney signed the 
agreement and certified that he consulted with plaintiff and advised her of her property rights 
and the legal significance of the antenuptial agreement. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that under the terms of an antenuptial agreement 
where each party has relinquished all rights to previously acquired property of the other 
party, he or she has no right to the other party's separate property nor any increase in value 
that might accrue to that property. Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73, 78 (Ut.App. 1991); 
Berman. 749 P.2d at 1271.l 
To date, Utah courts have not directly addressed the question of whether a warranty 
deed with rights of survivorship executed subsequent to an antenuptial agreement abrogates 
the terms and provisions of the antenuptial agreement. However, other jurisdictions have 
lrrhe Rudman court held that , under the parties antenuptial 
agreement, the husband's premarital property together with any 
increase would remain the property of the husband, in spite of 
the fact that the wife contributed labor and/or assets to the 
property during marriage. Rudman, 812 P.2d at 78. In Berman, 
the court overturned the lower court's order awarding the wife 
one-half the equity in the husband's separate property home 
purchased prior to marriage. The Berman court held that the 
antenuptial agreement preserved the husband's house as his 
separate property. The court based its reversal on evidence 
presented at trial wherein the wife knowingly and voluntarily 
entered the antenuptial agreement, no fraud or undue influence 
induced the wife to sign the agreement and the agreement stated 
that real property owned by the parties at the time of marriage 
was to remain the separate property of each spouse. Berman, 749 
P.2d at 1271. 
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confronted this very issue. In Peet v. Monger. 56 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1953), the parties 
entered into an antenuptial agreement prior to their marriage. Subsequent to the parties' 
execution of the antenuptial agreement, the wife executed a joint tenancy deed which 
contained no language expressly affecting the cancellation of the antenuptial agreement. The 
Iowa Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision by finding that, under the antenuptial 
agreement, the husband had no interest in or control over the joint tenancy property unless he 
survived the wife. See also In Re Marriage of Van Brocklin. 468 N.W.2d 40 (Iowa App. 
1991). 
In the case at hand, the warranty deed with rights of survivorship is void of language 
expressly canceling the antenuptial agreement. In fact, the deed expressly states that the 
deed is subject to all "existing covenants of whatever nature." Additionally, the antenuptial 
agreement existed at the time the warranty deed was executed and plaintiff had knowledge 
that the antenuptial agreement she executed on June 28, 1988 attempted to control and 
preserve the same property covered by the warranty deed. 
Plaintiff next argues that the antenuptial agreement was abrogated when the parties 
liquidated and expended their separate property in support of the marriage. This argument is 
baseless. Recital "E" of the antenuptial agreement expressly provides: 
Each of the parties mutually desires to retain, manage or dispose separately by 
gift, will or otherwise all of his or her estate to the same extent as if each of 
such parties remained single. 
Clearly, by executing the antenuptial agreement, the parties contractually retained the right to 
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dispose of their separate property by commingling such assets or otherwise.2 
Accordingly, the antenuptial agreement was not abrogated as to defendant's separate 
property which was not commingled or liquidated, and these assets are still protected under 
the provisions of the antenuptial agreement. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on several occasions that a trial court is not bound 
by the state of title to real property prior to the issuance of a divorce decree. Georgedes v. 
Georgedes. 627 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1981); Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 
1980); Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980); Lundgreen v. Lundgreen. 
184 P.2d 670 (Utah 1947). A trial court is empowered to make distributions as are just and 
equitable and may compel such conveyances as are necessary to that end. Jackson. 617 P.2d 
at 341. 
In upholding the lower court's decision in Georgedes. 627 P.2d at 45, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that it was equitable to return to the husband a home and business which 
he had brought into the marriage, notwithstanding that title had been placed in joint tenancy. 
According to the Georgedes court, the trial court's decree simply put the parties to a second 
2In Burt v, Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Ut.App. 1990), the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that separate property loses its separate 
character when the marital parties have inextricably commingled 
the separate property with marital property or when they have 
contributed all or part of the separate property to the marital 
estate. See also Rudman, 812 P.2d at 78. The analysis of both 
the Rudman and the Burt courts clearly indicates that separate 
property may be transmuted by the parties into marital property 
if such property cannot be traced to a separate property source. 
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marriage of relatively short real duration back into sole ownership of the properties they 
brought into the marriage. Id. at 45. 
In upholding the lower court's decision in Jesperson. 610 P.2d at 328, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that where the wife had used her separate property to purchase a mobile 
home during marriage and even though the mobile home was held in joint tenancy and 
substantially improved by the husband's labors, it was equitable for the lower court to award 
her an amount equal to the value of the assets she brought into the marriage. 
And, in a case which is factually similar to the case at hand, the Utah Supreme Court 
in Lundgreen. held that a wife was only entitled to receive one-half the market value in 
excess of the original purchase price of a home purchased during marriage with the 
husband's separate assets, even though the home was held in joint tenancy and the wife had 
contributed extensive labor and separate funds in remodeling the home. 184 P.2d at 672.3 
In arguing that she is entitled to one-half the value of defendant's separate property 
home, plaintiff relies on Hogue v. Hogue 831 P.2d 121 (Ut.App. 1992). In Hogue, the sole 
issue before the Utah Court of Appeals was whether a grantor spouse who conveyed his 
3A common factual theme exists in the Georcredes, Jesperson 
and Lundareen cases and the case at hand. In each situation, the 
parties were married for less than seven years, no children were 
born into the marriage, both parties had been married before, one 
of the parties either brought a premarital home into the marriage 
or the home was purchased with that party7s separate funds, title 
to the home was placed in joint tenancy within the first year of 
marriage, and the other party allegedly contributed labor, income 
and/or assets to remodel or improve the realty. 
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entire interest in his separately owned real property, was entitled to a one-half interest in the 
property upon the parties divorce. Plaintiffs reliance upon Hogue is misplaced. 
The Hogue case is factually distinguishable from the facts of the Georgedes. Jesperson 
and Lundgreen cases and the case at hand. In Hogue. the parties had been married for an 
unspecified period of time, were divorced, then remarried. Subsequent to their remarriage, 
In fact, Mr. Hogue transferred his entire interest in real property to his wife, as a means of 
protecting the property from his judgment creditors. Unlike the case at hand, there was no 
prenuptial agreement. The parties contracted for the purchase of additional acreage adjoining 
the real property. The parties cohabitated together on the property prior to being remarried, 
and the parties' second marriage lasted for over seven years. Lastly, the facts do not 
indicate whether Mr. Hogue had asked the trial court for anything more than a one-half 
interest in the property. 
Utah courts have held that upon divorce, each party should retain the separate 
property he or she brought into the marriage. Dunn v. Dunn. 802 ).2d 1314 (Ut.App. 
1990). In making a property division, a trial court should take into consideration all the 
pertinent circumstances of the parties' marriage. Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431, 
432 (Utah 1982); Jackson. 617 P.2d at 338; English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). 
The pertinent circumstances this court must consider are: (1) the duration of the 
marriage; (2) the parties' ages at time of marriage and whether any children were born into 
the marriage; (3) the amount and kind of property to be divided, whether the property was 
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acquired before or during the marriage, and the source of the property; (4) the parties' 
standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs and earning capacity; and (5) the 
health of the parties. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120 (Ut.App. 1992). 
The court notes the following facts. First, the parties were married for fewer than 
three years. From the day they were married, July 1, 1988, to the date of their final 
separation, December 1, 1990, the parties were only married for twenty-nine months. 
Additionally, during this twenty-nine month period the parties experienced a brief trial 
separation of five months. 
Second, plaintiff was 47 years old and defendant was 56 upon their marriage. The 
marriage was plaintiffs third marriage and was defendant's second marriage. No children 
were born into the marriage. 
Third, the amount which plaintiff is seeking to obtain, $52,500 (one-half the value of 
her 1990 appraisal on the home), substantially exceeds the monies she paid toward the 
remodeling of the home, $12,500. This court takes into consideration the fact that defendant 
has owned the property in question since 1966, and that at the time of marriage, the home 
was free and clear of all encumbrances and liens. 
The home has special meaning to defendant since he has raised all nine of his children 
in the home. If this court were to award plaintiff one-half the value of the home, defendant 
would be forced to sell the home to reimburse plaintiff since he is unemployed. 
Fourth, defendant is not in the same financial situation as he was prior to marriage. 
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Due to a slowdown in his business and because of his deteriorating health, defendant was 
forced to sell his business. Defendant is currently unemployed and is looking for work. On 
the other hand, Plaintiff has been employed at all times relevant hereto at Brigham Young 
University. Due to her younger age and higher salary, plaintiff has an opportunity to recoup 
some of her losses while defendant's age and health may prevent him from securing steady 
full-time employment. Plaintiffs wages have steadily increased during the marriage with 
reasonable expectation that they will continue to do so. 
Fifth, both parties liquidated substantial sums of their separate property assets and 
incurred substantial debts and obligations during the marriage. While plaintiff may have 
spent considerable sums during the marital period and incurred substantial debts an 
obligations, not all her expenditures or debts went to the marital estate. In 1989, plaintiff 
sold her major asset, the Monroe property. She immediately dispersed $24,000 to her 
children. This dispersement constituted the most significant reduction of her net worth 
during the marriage. 
It appears that the deed was also drafted and executed with some haste. The parties 
were to married only three days after defendant executed the deed. The question that comes 
to mind is why would the parties execute two completely conflicting documents unless one 
was not anticipated or planned for by the parties? The antenuptial agreement was clearly 
intended by the parties to protect their separate property. That is precisely why they sought 
the services of an attorney. On the other hand, the warranty deed divested defendant of 
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fifty-percent of his ownership interest in his home. Clearly, the warranty deed was an 
afterthought by the parties. 
From the testimony of Mr. Nielson, counsel for plaintiff, it is not clear that he sent a 
copy of the subject deed to Ray Ivie, counsel for defendant, for his review. This fact seems 
to be substantiated by dates and notary acknowledgements of defendant's signature on the 
warranty deed and the antenuptial agreement. Defendant's June 29, 1988, signature on both 
the warranty deed and affidavit of surviving joint tenant was acknowledged by Mr. Nielson's 
notary, Cynthia Shumway, while defendant's June 30, 1988 signature on the antenuptial 
agreement was acknowledge by Ivie & Young's notary, Lois Pinster. If the deed had been 
sent over to Ivie & Young for their review, prior to the deed's execution, defendant's 
signature would have been most likely notarized by Ivie & Young's notary as well. 
Under the rationale of the Utah Supreme Court in Georgedes. Jesperson and 
Lundgreen where one of the parties contributes separate property assets to remodel or 
improve a home brought into the marriage by the other spouse, and title to the home is 
placed in joint tenancy within the first year of marriage, it is equitable to return to the spouse 
who contributed their separate property assets to remodel or improve the premarital house 
that spouses actual remodeling expenditures plus one-half of the increase in value to the 
property is such increase exists. 
In the case at hand, the parties have stipulated that the value of defendant's premarital 
home in 1988, prior to the marriage and any improvements was $77,0000. The court has 
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found that the home's value was $105,000.00 upon the parties separation on December 1, 
1990. The parties stipulated that plaintiff contributed $12,562. 65 toward the remodeling of 
defendant's home and that defendant expended $11,931.00 on the remodeling. In addition, 
defendant reimbursed plaintiff $5,550.00 for remodeling costs. 
Based on the foregoing, even though the court has determined that the value of 
Defendant's premarital home upon the parties final separation was $105,000.00, this court 
finds that the home did not increase in value since the value of defendant's premarital home 
in 1988 plus the amount of monies the parties paid toward the remodeling or $106,993.65, 
exceeds the $105,000 appraised value of the home.4 
C DECISION ON DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
Plaintiff is not entitled to one-half of defendant's interest in the home and plaintiff has 
no life estate. Taking into consideration all of the pertinent circumstances, it is just and 
equitable that plaintiff convey title to the subject property to defendant. 
Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for her actual pre-marriage and post marriage 
expenditures for remodeling in the stipulated amount of $12,562.65. The balance of the 
4
 $77,000 [value of home in 1988] 
+ $12,562.65 [value of plaintiffs remodeling 
expenditures] 
+ $5,500 [amount defendant reimbursed plaintiff 
for remodeling] 
+ $11,931 [value of defendant's remodeling 
expenditures] 
$ 1 0 6 , 9 9 3 . 6 5 
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issues respecting personal property division and financial obligations are resolved by the 
stipulation and appear just and equitable. 
m. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant proffered an 
offer of judgment to plaintiff of $24,000.00 on or about August 12, 1992. Since plaintiffs 
judgment is not more favorable than defendant's $24,000.00 offer, plaintiff must pay 
defendant's costs incurred after the making of the offer. Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and 
Richard L. Peel, Esq., counsel for defendant, have submitted affidavits in support of 
attorney's fees generated since August 12, 1992. The court finds the amount set forth to be 
fair and reasonable under the circumstances; $2,360.00 for the legal services of Mr. Peel and 
$2,289 for legal services rendered by Ms. Brown. Plaintiff is obligated to pay $4,649.00. 
The court finds that both the plaintiff and defendant are in need of financial assistance 
and, thereby, orders that each pay respective attorney's fees except as set forth above. 
Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from and against the defendant, the same to 
become final and absolute upon signing by the court and entry by the clerk in the Registry of 
Actions. Plaintiff is also entitled to the restoration of her maiden name. 
Counsel have submitted proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
in connection with this case. Upon review, defendant's proposal most closely reflects the 
ruling of the court except for the attorney's fee issue. 
The court directs counsel for the defendant to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of 
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law and decree of divorce consistent with the foregoing decision of the Court and the 
stipulation of the parties received at trial. 
DATED AT PROVO, UTAH, this ^ f d a y of September, 1992. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET R. COX, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
K. NORMAN COX, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Case No. 904402060 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
I hereby certify that I caused to mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the court's Decision on September 28, 1992, to the following: 
Gary Weight, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ALDRIDGE, NELSON, WEEGHT & ESPLIN 
P.O. Box L 
Provo, UT 84603 
Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
ROBINSON, SEILER, GLAZIER & BROWN 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 1266 
Richard L. Peel, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
228 S. Fourth Street 
Las Vegas, NV 89101 
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APPENDIX "D" 
Notice of Appeal 
4?>. r, '''J ""I 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
ST.-:-- ;:^ ' l-j_0URr 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
JANET R. COX, n, 
Plaintiff, NOTICE OF APPEAL^ 
-vs- Civil No. 904402060 
K. NORMAN COX, Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF TO THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION, by and through her 
counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, hereby appeals from the 
final Judgment Decree of Divorce in the above-entitled action; 
entered on or about October 28, 1992. 
DATED THIS ^ T day of A^O V -& mh£^_
 f 1992. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon 
defendant by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an 
envelope addressed to: 
MARILYN MOODY BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant 
80 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84606 
RICHARD PEEL 
Attorney for Defendant 
228 South Fourth Street 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon/ in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah 
on the ^ ^ day of / V O ^ ^ N O ^ V , 1992. 
- § ^ — • — 
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APPENDIX "E" 
Antenuptial Property Agreement 
COff 
ANTENUPTIAL PROPERTY AGREEMENT 
Antenuptial Agreement made this day of 
19 £B , between KENNETH NORMAN COX, an adult, hereinafter 
referred to as prospective husband, and JANET J. REX, an adult, 
hereinafter referred to as prospective wife, in consideration of 
the contemplated marriage of the above-named parties. 
RECITALS 
A. A marriage is intended and desired to be solemnized 
between the parties hereto. 
B. Each of the parties is possessed of property which they 
separately own or have an interest in their own individual right. 
C. Each of the parties has made a full disclosure to the 
other party of all of his or her property and assets and of the 
value thereof, and this Agreement is entered into with a full 
knowledge on the part of each as to the extent and probable value 
of the estate of the other, and of all the rights conferred by 
law on each in the estate of the other by virtue of such proposed 
marriage. 
D. Intanticipation of such marriage the parties desire to 
fix and determine the rights of each of them in any and all 
property of every nature and description and wheresoever located 
that the other of them may own or have an interest in at the time 
of such marriage or may acquire thereafter. 
E. Each of the parties mutually desires to retain, manage 
or dispose separately by gift, will or otherwise all of his or 
her estate to the same extent as if each of such parties remained 
single. 
In consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, 
the parties agree as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
Each of the parties hereto shall retain the title, manage-
ment and control of the estates now owned by each of them, 
whether real, personal or mixed, and all increase or addition 
thereto, entirely free and unmolested by the other party and may 
encumber, sell, dispose, give or provide by will for the dispo-
sition of any or all of such estates so separately owned and 
possessed. At the death of either no claim by inheritance, des-
cent, surviving spouse award, homestead, dower or maintenance 
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shall be made by either of the parties hereto against the other 
or against the estate of the other. 
ARTICLE II 
Each of the parties hereto separately waives any and all 
rights by dower, homestead, surviving spouse award, inheritance, 
descent or any other marital right arising by virtue of statute 
or otherwise in and to any parcel of the estate now owned and 
possessed by the other, and does hereby agree and consent that 
each shall have full power and control in all respects to exer-
cise free and undisputed ownership, management and disposition of 
each of such estates and increases thereto now owned and pos-
sessed by the parties, and each of such parties does waive and 
renounce any legal and statutory rights that might, under any 
law, be set up against any part of the estate of the other and 
does consent that the estate of each shall descend or be disposed 
of by will or otherwise to the heirs or legatees or devisees of 
each of the parties, free and clear of any claim by inheritance, 
dower, surviving spouse award or homestead or maintenance or any 
claim otherwise given bylaw to a husband and wife. 
ARTICLE III 
This Agreement shall not in any manner, bar or affect, the 
right of either party to claim and receive any property of any 
nature or character that the other party hereto, by last will, or 
by any other instrument, may give, devise, bequeath, transfer or 
assign to the other party hereto. 
ARTICLE IV 
If either party shall mortgage, pledge, or sell and convey, 
his or her real or personal estate, whether in whole or in part, 
the other party hereto shall, upon demand, from time to time join 
in any and every mortgage, or deed of conveyance, or in any other 
instrument that.may be necessary or desirable to make the same 
effectual. 
ARTICLE V 
In the event that at any time during the existence of the 
marital relationship between the parties, they should be or 
become residents of a state under the laws of which husband and 
wife acquire property interests commonly known as community 
property or any other property and interests different from the 
property interests of husband and wife under the laws of the 
State of Utah, their property interests shall nevertheless remain 
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the same as they would have been under the terms of this agree-
ment construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, 
and the parties will each, at any time during or after the termi-
nation of the marital relationship, execute and deliver any and 
all deeds and other instruments desirable or necessary to trans-
fer any right, title or interest, in any property or estate of 
the other which they may acquire by virtue of any so-called 
community property laws to the persons who would otherwise be 
entitled thereto by virtue of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE VI 
If the prospective husband shall survive the prospective 
wife, the prospective husband shall not. as surviving husband, 
make any claim to any part, or share, of the real and/or personal 
estate of which the prospective wife may die seized or possessed. 
The prospective husband, in consideration of such marriage, 
hereby expressly waives and relinquishes all right in and to the 
real property of which the prospective wife may die seized, as 
well as all right in and to the personal estate of the pro-
spective wife, or a surviving husband, heir-at-law, or otherwise. 
ARTICLE VII 
If the prospective wife shall survive the prospective hus-
band, she shall not, as surviving wife, make any claim to any 
part, or share, of the real and/or personal estate of which the 
prospective husband may die seized or possessed. The prospective 
wife hereby waives and relinquishes all claims to an allowance, 
homestead, widow's award, or any other right in and to the real 
and/or personal estate of which the prospective husband may die 
seized or possessed. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Neither party hereto, by virtue of such marriage, shall 
have, or acquire, any right, title or claim in and to the real or 
personal estate of the other, that the estate of each shall 
descend to or vest in his or her, heirs-at-law, legatees, or 
devisees, as may be prescribed by his or her last will and 
testament, or in default of such last will and testament, by the 
law then in force, as though no marriage had ever taken place 
between the parties. 
ARTICLE IX 
This Agreement is entered into by the parties hereto with 
full knowledge on the part of each of the extent and probable 
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value of all of the property or estate of the other, and of all 
rights that, but for this Agreement, would be conferred by law 
upon each of them in the property or estate of the other, by 
virtue of the consummation of the proposed marriage, and the 
rights of the respective parties hereto in and to each other's 
property, or estate, of whatsoever character the same may be, 
shall be determined, fixed and settled by this Agreement, and not 
otherwise. Prospective husband represents that, on the date of 
this Agreement, the approximate value of his property and assets 
is THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS 380,000.00 ) . 
Prospective wife represents that, on the date of this Agreement, 
the approximate value of her property and assets is SEVENTY 
THOUSAND AND NO/100 DPI LARS ($ 70.000.00 ). 
ARTICLE X 
This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the 
parties relating to their antenuptial property arrangements. 
There are no oral Agreements between the parties respecting such 
antenuptial property arrangements. Any alteration or modifica-
tion of this Agreement must be in writing, signed and acknow-
ledged by each of the parties hereto. 
ARTICLE XI 
This Agreement shall bind the parties hereto and their 
respective heirs, administrators and assigns, and shall become 
effective only upon the consummation of the proposed marriage 
between the parties hereto, and if such marriage does not take 
place, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
ARTICLE XII 
The parties hereto both stipulate that they, and each of 
them, were represented by legal counsel of their choice in the 
preparation of this Agreement; that they have read this Agreement 
and have had its contents explained, and to each of them, by such 
counsel; and that they fully understand the terms, provisions, 
and legal consequences of this Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement 
at Provo, Utah, the day and year first above written. 
/KENNETH NORMAN/JCOX / 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
) 
ss. 
) 
On <jyx(\t30l \c\%<& , personally appeared before me 
KENNETH NORMAN COX, one of the signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the, 
same.
 y - ^
 p
'4/,y>, 
'mil" "* ~' 
OTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing At: H*l)V(\ \LMh 
•>.. 
1*1 
w\*•• •'• A> / 
'••, v O r 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
) 
ss. 
) 
On June 28, 1988 personally appeared before me 
JANET J. REX, one of the signers of the foregoing instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC / y C/")o \\ 
My Commission Expires: August 14, 1991 
Residing At: Provo, Utah 
*0 
r<h 
von 
•-IM'. 
CATION OF ATTORNEY 
_ certify that I am a licensed 
id to practice law in the State of Utah; that I 
have consulteaSwith KENNETH NORMAN COX, who is a party to the 
foregoing Agreement, and that I have fully advised him of his 
property rights and the legal significance of the foregoing 
Agreement; and that KENNETH NORMAN COX has acknowledged his full 
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and complete understanding of the legal consequences and of the 
terms and provisions of the foregoing Agreement anc^. has freely 
and voluntarily executed the Agreement in 
:ss, 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On , personally appeared before me 
_, Attorney at law, signer of the 
above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he exec^ tied**^  
the same. %%% ' * 0l* 
ti 
X\At 
NOTARY PUBLI 
My Commission Expire, 
Residing At: Vtnrn; 
J f e p T A ^ V « \ 
1*1 
"'••..mM*1 ' 
CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY 
I, DOUGLAS A. NIELSON, certify that I am a licensed 
attorney, admitted to practice law in the State of Utah; that I 
have consulted with JANET J. REX, who is a party to the foregoing 
Agreement, and that I have fully advised her of her property 
rights and the legal significance of the foregoing Agreement; and 
that JANET J. REX has acknowledged her full and complete under-
standing of the legal consequences and of the terms and pro-
visions of the foregoing Agreement and^ fe^ s freely and voluntarily 
executed the Agreement in my presence 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
:ss. 
On June 28, 1988 , personally appeared before me 
DOUGLAS A. NIELSON, Attorney at law, signer of the above* 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: August 14, 1991 
Residing At: Provo. Utah 
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APPENDIX "P" 
Warranty Deed 
[^PLAINTIFFS 
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RECORDED FOR DOUGLAS A NIEL3GN 
NORMAN COX, grantor, hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS to NORMAN 
COX and JANET J. REX, as joint tenants with full rights of 
survivor- ship and not as tenants in common, grantees, of 773 
South 400 East, Orem, Utah, for the sum of TEN DOLLARS ($10.00) 
and other valuable consideration, the following described real 
property situated in Utah County, State of Utah: 
Commencing in the intersection of the East Boundary of 400 
East Street, Orem, Utah,m and the grantors South fence line 
extended, said point being 207.90 feet North and 43.40 feet 
East of the Center of Section 23, Township 6 Sourh, Range 
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North along the 
East boundary of said Street 66.00 feet; thence South 88* 
55' East along a fence line extended and a fence line 241.35 
feet to the grantors East fence line; thence South 0* 44' 
West along said East fence line 65.50 feet to the said South 
fence line; thence North 89* 02' West along said fence line 
and fence line extended 241.00 feet to the point of begin-
ning. 
Together with all appurtenances thereunto belonging. 
This deed is hereby made expressly subject to all existing 
and recorded restrictions, exceptions, reservations, easements, 
rights-of-way, conditions, liens, encumbrances, and covenants of 
whatever nature, if any, and is expressly subject to all munici-
pal, city, county, and state zoning laws and other ordinances, 
regulations, and restrictions, including statutes and other laws 
of municipal, county, or other governmental authorities appli-
cable to and enforceable against the premises described herein. 
WITNESS the hands of said grantors this / Y day of 
NORMAN COX 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On June 29, 1988 , personally appeared before 
EXHIBIT * 
• H T 1 S 7 0 2 5K 2 5 2 2 PG 7 9 5 
me NORMAN COX, the signer of the within instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Exp i res : August U, 1991 
Res id ing At: Provo,, Utan 
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: 
Douglas A. Nielson 
3 319 North University Avenue, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
3n_v •• 
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MAIL TAX NOTICE TO: 
Grantees 
773 South 400 East 
Orem, Utah 84058 
STATS OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT OF SURVIVING JOINT TENANT 
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) 
: s s . 
) 
NORMAN COX, of legal^ age, being duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
That RUBY GURR DUKE COX, the decedent mentioned in the 
attached certified copy of Certificate of Death, is the same 
person as RUBY S. COX, named as one of the parties in that 
certain Quit-Claim Deed dated November 6, 1967, executed by MARY 
ANN DUKE, FENTON J. PRINCE and LILLIAN T. PRINCE, recorded as 
Entry No. 7627, in Book 1117 Page 78 of official records 
of Utah County, State of Utah, concerning the real property 
situated in the County of Utah, State of Utah and described as 
follows: 
Commencing in the intersection of the East Boundary of 400 
East Street, Orem, Utah, and the grantors South fence line 
extended, said point being 207.90 feet North and 43.40 feet 
East of the Center of Section 23, Township 6 South, Range 
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North along the 
East boundary of said Street 66.00 feet; thence South 88* 
55' East along a fence line extended and a fence line 241.85 
feet to the grantors East fence line; thence South 0* 44' 
West along said East fence line 65.50 feet to the said South 
fence line; thence North 89* 02' West along said fence line 
and fence line extended 241.00 feet to the point of begin-
ning. 
J DATED this 4 -z* day of 19 >T* 
J 
.£= 
NORMAN COX 
773 South 400 East 
Orem, Utah 84053 
Telephone: (801) 225-3731 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
: ss 
On t h e 29th day of June 19 88 , 
personally appeared before me NORMAN COX, the signer of the 
within and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 
he executed the same. 
ENTi^TO 1 BK 2 S 2 2 PS 7<? 1 
(j gMr \\jf( X\\l^A<\li: 
N o t a t y P u b l i c 
My Commission E x p i r e s : August 14, 1991 
R e s i d i n g A t : Provo. man 
